In [7] , open questions are raised regarding the computational strengths of so-called ∞-α-Turing machines, a family of models of computation resembling the infinitetime Turing machine (ITTM) model of [2] , except with α-length tape (for α ≥ ω). Let T α denote the machine model of tape length α (so T ω is just the ITTM model). T ω . (2) There are countable ordinals α such that T α T ω , the smallest of which is precisely γ, the supremum of ordinals clockable by T ω . In fact, there is a hierarchy of countable T α s of increasing strength corresponding to the transfinite (weak) Turing-jump operator ∇ . (3) There is a countable ordinal μ such that neither T μ T ω1 nor T μ T ω1 -that is, the models T μ and T ω1 are computation-strength incommensurable (and the same holds if countable μ > μ replaces μ). A similar fact holds for any larger uncountable device replacing T ω1 . (4) Further observations are made about countable T α .
Background
Over the past few years, interest has grown in the study of models of transfinite computation-theoretical machines that extend classical computibility theory into an infinitary context. A number of distinct models have been devised, typically resembling one of the classical machines (Turing machines, register machines, etc.) but with some modification that takes the operations into the transfinite. For a detailed survey, see [14] or [15] . Of the machines so defined during this recent wave, particular attention has been given to the infinite time Turing machines of [2] , which were the first to see print.
Infinite time Turing machines, or ITTMs, are a set of theoretical computing machines similar to classical Turing machines, with the exception that halting computations are not assumed to run for only finitely many steps. Instead, computations are permitted to run for transfinitely many steps before halting. Whereas a classical finitary Turing machine is considered to "fail" in some sense if it does not successfully halt within a finite number of steps, an ITTM may compute through steps 1, 2, . . . , ω, (ω + 1), (ω + 2), . . . , (ω + ω), . . . and halt after, say, ω 4 + ω + 17 steps. It can even halt after a non-recursive ordinal number of steps.
In [2] , the machines are conceived as having three tapes: an input tape, an output tape, and a scratch tape intended for calculations. Each machine has a read-write head that at any given time occupies the nth cell C n of each of these tapes simultaneously (the leftmost cell is C 0 , and the tapes have ω-many cells extending infinitely to the right). In the present work, we instead imagine just a single tape for input and output, with a parallel tape for scratch work. This type of machine is computationally equivalent to the three-tape machines.
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It will be convenient to use the fact from [3, Corollary 2.4] that it is possible to use the single scratch tape of a machine to simulate having a machine with multiple parallel tapes. As described in [6] , there are "canonical but tedious" translations of programs on machines with n tapes to programs on machines with one tape. We also recall from [6] that one can use finite binary strings as codes for 'symbols', and thus at times may treat the tape as containing a sequence of arbitrary symbols from an alphabet rather than binary bits.
Since an ITTM may run for transfinitely many steps, it has time to read and process infinite-length input, and to write infinite-length output. Hence ITTMs can be understood as computing (partial) functions on the reals ω 2. (We can still represent a natural number k by a string consisting of all 0s except C k .) The functions computable by an ITTM form a strict superset of the Turing-computable functions.
To define the machine's behavior fully, [2] stipulates that on successor ordinal steps, cell values are calculated identically to the way they are determined in a Turing machine, but at limit ordinal steps, cell values take on the lim sup of their values at previous stages.
2 In the present paper, as in [6] and elsewhere, the lim inf is used instead. The difference is immaterial as the resulting models of computation are equivalent. We also set the machine's head position and program state at the limit stage to their respective lim inf s from prior stages.
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For ITTMs there are both computable and noncomputable functions f : ω 2 → ω 2. Any recursive function is computable, as is the classical halting problem. An ITTM can solve the latter by running any Turing machine computation in parallel with some program known to halt after ω steps, checking whether the simulated Turing computation has halted or not by that stage. The model's computational power goes far beyond this, however. It is capable of deciding membership in any set of reals up to complexity Π 1 1 -in particular, it is able to determine whether a give real a ∈ ω 2 codes 4 a well-ordered relation on N (see [2] ).
However, all ITTM-decidable sets of reals (indeed, all ITTM semi-decidable sets of reals) fall below complexity Δ 1 2 . For an example of non-computable functions, there are ITTM analogs of the classical halting problem, defined below.
While it is clear that the ITTM model is strictly stronger than the finite Turing model, it is natural to ask whether it can be made even stronger. In [2] , there is some analysis of extensions of the model using oracles. In [6] , the model is extended by lengthening the tape from having ω-many cells to having a proper class of cells (indexed by ordinals α ∈ Ord). In [1] and [8] , machines with fixed α-length tape are considered, with α assumed to be admissible. For these, the assumption is also made that computation duration is limited to be below α-many steps. In analogy with Turing computation, which can be thought of as running on ω-length tapes for some duration below ω-many steps, these machines run with α-length 1 Indeed, by [3] , it is sufficient to have just one cell for scratch work accompanying the input/output tape to guarantee the same capabilities as the three-tape ITTM. Without this, a machine can compute most, though curiously not all, of the functions computable by three-tape machines.
2 That is, the value of cell n at limit ordinal step α is 0 (respectively, 1) if it had stabilized at value 0 (respectively, 1) by some step β < α (in other words, it had that value at step β and did not change after), but if the value of cell n did not stabilize (i.e., it changed its value infinitely often cofinally before step α), then at the limit α it defaults to value 1. If [2] had used lim inf instead (as we do here), then it would behave the same except default instead to value 0.
3 Rather than these stipulations, in [2] there is a special program state designated for limit steps called the limit state, and the head position is automatically set to C 0 at limit steps, but it again makes no material difference. 4 Every real r is considered to code the relation on the set N given by: a b iff the a, b th digit of r is 1, where · , · refers to the Gödel pairing function.
tape for some duration below α-many steps. What results is a theory of transfinite computability in which the computational behavior of the machines bears a relationship to Sacks' α-recursion theory from [12] .
In the present paper, the machines under consideration are also of fixed α-length tape, but without restriction of the tape length to any particular type of ordinal and without bound on the potential duration of computations. Rather, in view of existing open questions (cf. [7, Section 3] ), the α-machines here will parallel infinite time Turing machines, whose computational run times have no fiat limitation. It will emerge instead as a consequence of these machines' design that, just as all ITTM computations that halt will do so within at most a countable number of steps (Settling Theorem [2, Thm. 1.2]), so too will a machine of length α halt within at most |α|-many steps. We allow for inadmissible ordinal-sized machines-indeed, for machines with successor ordinal size-out of a motivation to describe the most general and inclusive class of machines possible, even though it happens that the most interesting results occur with machines of admissible length.
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In analogy with ITTMs computing on real numbers (taken as elements of Cantor space ω 2), a machine with α-length tape computes on α-length binary strings α 2. At times it will be useful to refer to the "hardware" of a machine (the tape and head) without mention of any particular choice of program. We refer to such hardware as a device. Thus a device together with a choice of program p ∈ N constitutes a machine, and a device without mention of any such p can be identified with the class of machines characterized by having a specified tape length. Let T α denote the device with tape length α. On this notation, T ω can be understood as the class of ITTMs.
The behavior of a device T α can be described as follows. If τ is a successor ordinal, the head position at time τ is defined identically as in the Turing machine case, with one proviso: when the device is instructed to move the head somewhere undefined, its position defaults to C 0 . This occurs when an instruction to move left occurs while the head resides on a limit ordinal cell, as there is no determinate "next cell to the left" in such cases. The head position would also be undefined if α = β + 1 and T α 's head is instructed to move right while on the rightmost cell β. It is again natural to stipulate in such cases that the head returns to cell 0. Similarly, if α is a limit ordinal and the head is instructed to move right for α-many steps on T α , then the head, having nowhere further to go, defaults to C 0 . In general, at limit ordinal times τ the head position is determined by taking the lim inf of prior head positions.
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If we let D(τ ) denote the configuration of a machine after exactly τ steps of computing (that is, a complete description of the head position, tape contents, program state, and choice of program), then the above completely defines a model of computation whose configuration at all times is deterministically and uniquely given by the initial configuration D(0). When context requires a distinction, we will use subscripts-e.g., D α,p,x (τ ) for the configuration of the computation α p (x) at step τ . For reference, the description just given of the machines' behavior is formalized below in Definitions 1.1-1.3, which resemble definitions found in [6] except for appropriate modifications to Definition 1.3. These two conditions together guarantee that for every program state appearing in a program, there exists a unique command informing the device what to do when the cell content at the current head position is 0 and another unique command for when the cell content at the current head position is 1.
Let states(P ) = {s | (s, c, c , m, s ) ∈ P } be the set of program states in P . Because there are finitely many states, there are countably many possible programs, so we will commonly identify programs by Gödel numbers p ∈ N.
1. θ is a successor ordinal or θ = Ord. We call θ (and, informally, θ − 1) the length of the computation (equally, the duration or run time). 
If t < θ and S(t) /
∈ P , then θ = t + 1; the computation halts if the machine's state is not a program state of P .
If t < θ and S(t) ∈ states(P
) then t + 1 < θ. Let (s, c, c , m, s ) be the unique command in P such that S(t) = s and T (t) H(t) = c. Then: (a) S(t + 1) = s (b) H(t + 1) = ⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩
H(t) + 1 if m = 1 and H(t) < α H(t) − 1 if m = 0 and H(t) is a successor ordinal 0 o t h e r w i s e (c)
At limit ordinal times t < θ, the machine's configuration takes on inferior limits of previous values:
If a program p run on T α with input x ∈ α 2 halts with output y ∈ α 2, we write α p (x) ↓ y. We say a partial function f : α 2 α 2 is T α -computable if there is a program p such that, for any input x ∈ dom(f ) (represented as a binary string), we have α p (x) ↓ f (x). For our purposes, if α 0 < α 1 , we identify a ∈ α 0 2 with a 1 ∈ α 1 2 if a 1 is identical to a concatenated solely with 0s. Hence even if β = α we allow some 7 In [2] , computations are treated as being able to potentially have a limit ordinal length. In contrast, [6] defines computations in such a way that they may only halt at successor ordinal steps. The present paper uses an approach more similar to that of [6] , and while this choice leads to no functional difference in computational outcomes, it does influence statements one can make about run times. For instance, results that are otherwise interesting, such as [2, Thm. 8.8] ('No admissible ordinal is clockable') become trivial when computations are defined in such a way that they cannot halt at limit ordinals but only one step later. In [9, Def. 3], the definition of clockable is modified to address this, but here we instead use 'length' and related expressions to refer to θ − 1. Context will make clear if we ever mean θ instead. In short, we pretend when convenient that we followed [2] in the formalism. 
Both sets are undecidable by T α , by the same argument as in the classical case. 8 These will prove useful toward the aim of comparing the relative strengths of varying T α , as we will be able to show that one device is computationally stronger than another by showing it is at least as strong and is also able to decide the other device's halting problem(s). Formally, we define "strength" by:
is at least as strong as T β , with respect to functions on min(α,β) 2") if T β computes no functions f :
The default way to show that T α T β will be to show that T α can emulate any computation on T β and can also decide h β .
Results

Reachability
Note that it does not go without saying that T α T β whenever α > β. Nor does the converse hold. In case α > β, we provide in Proposition 2.1 a necessary and sufficient condition for T α T β . Later, in Lemma 2.6, we provide a sufficient condition applicable for any α and β. To say that a cell is reachable is not to say merely that the head can be placed there. Otherwise, every cell would be 'reachable' in that sense. Instead, reachability refers to a device's ability to be programmed to find a particular cell with its head, recognize that it is there, and then halt-in a sense, to put its finger on that cell. As will be seen, some devices have unreachable cells, imposing strong limitations on their computational abilities.
Proof. Assume that all computations described here begin with input string 0.
For the forward direction, suppose that T α T β . Note that T β , like any other device, can be programmed to fill its entire tape with 1s and then halt. To do this it just needs to print a 1 and then move right, then repeat this process until the value at the current head position is already 1. At this point the routine can 8 The classical analogs of both these halting problems are of equivalent Turing difficulty, so they are often not heavily distinguished, but in the infinitary case they are distinct. The "strong" halting problem H α is much more complex than the "weak" problem h α . See [2] for discussion of these points with respect to H ω and h ω in particular. 9 We could have defined without the restriction to functions f : min(α,β) 2 → min(α,β) 2, comparing instead how two devices T α and T β fare on all functions on binary strings. In this case, we would trivially have that T α T β whenever α = β, since if (without loss) α > β, the device T α can compute functions f : α 2 → α 2 not computable by T β by the brute fact that the input and output strings do not fit on T β 's tape. We find the resulting definition of 'strength' not to capture the notion we are interested in as effectively as the one above. We want, for example, to say T ω ∼ = T ω+1 , considering the fact that T ω and T ω+1 compute precisely the same functions f : ω 2 → ω 2 (see Lemma 2.6 below) and the T ω+1 -computable functions f : ω+1 2 → ω+1 2 are not capable of accomplishing anything of mathematical interest not already accomplished by the functions f . Moreover, it would be strange to have a notion of computational strength whereby the addition of one cell to an already infinitely long tape causes a meaningful increase of strength.
stop, since the head must have by now traversed the tape's full length and returned around to cell 0 (because the head always returns to cell 0 whenever its position is otherwise undefined). Thus T β can be programmed to print a strings of 1s of exactly length β and then stop. Since T α T β , there must therefore exist a program causing T α to print a string of 1s of exactly length β. Let it do so, then seek out C β (the first cell not containing a 1), place the head there and halt.
For the other direction, first have T α run a routine that reaches C β , except that the halting command is replaced by an instruction to mark the current location (C β ) with a unique symbol on the scratch tape. Any T β -computation can now be simulated on T α by adding a program instruction to return the head immediately to C 0 every time it reads this symbol (i.e., occupies C β ).
To show C ω is always T α -reachable for all α > ω, we note that we can repeatedly move the output tape's head to the right, while simultaneously reserving a "flag" cell on the scratch tape that initially has a 1 and then flashes off and then on again each time the head moves. After exactly ω steps, the flag will read 0 by the lim inf operation, signaling the machine to halt. 2
Settling
In the literature, a computation is said to be settled when it has reached a point at which it has either halted or entered into an endlessly repeating loop.
10 It is proven in [2] that all computations on T ω necessarily settle within countably many steps-thus, if any T ω computation runs for an uncountable number of steps and has not yet halted, then it never will. A similar result is true in general for all T α . We state the result without proof, as the argument is essentially identical to [2, Thm. 1.1].
Theorem 2.2 (α-Settling Theorem). For all cardinals κ, computation on any device T α such that |α| = κ will either halt or enter an endless loop within a number of steps of cardinality κ.
This places an upper bound on the maximum run time of halting T α -computations. For a lower bound, observe that there is a program-call it LoopAround-that halts after exactly α steps when run with input 0 on any T α . In pseudo-code:
MoveRight ; WHILE ( HeadPosition > 0) MoveRight ; end ;
The LoopAround algorithm moves the head to the right exactly α times, then halts. One might notice that in this code there is an implicit assumption that the machine is capable of recognizing when the head is located on C 0 . One of many ways to accomplish this is to include, e.g., an instruction at the beginning of the algorithm to print a special symbol on C 0 of a scratch tape, then use this as a reference point during later computation. 11 Let γ(α) denote the supremum of T α -clockable ordinals.
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The above remarks mean that T α can clock α, and also that γ(α) has cardinality |α| (because there are countably many programs p). Therefore, we have: 10 Here 'loop' is taken in a strong sense, namely that the machine is in the same configuration D α,p,x at two different limit ordinal stages and no cell with value 1 at the earlier stage ever subsequently changes to 0, a stipulation without which the machine might break out of the repetition at the second limit stage through the lim inf operation. 11 The special case of T ω -clockable ordinals was first defined in [2] , which called them the clockable ordinals. The structure of these ordinals is explored in [2] and subsequent work by P. Welch. 12 The existing literature refers to γ(ω) as γ. We use both here interchangeably, and also let γ 0 (α) := α and γ β+1 (α) := γ(γ β (α)), with analogous definition for limit γ β (α).
In fact, we have in general:
Proof. Consider the following algorithm. 13 Given a T β -computation, simulate it on a scratch tape (since C β is α-reachable, we immediately have T α T β ). Simultaneously, run a LoopAround clock on another scratch tape. If the T β -simulation halts, print 'yes'. If it does not halt before the LoopAround does, then print 'no', as α steps have passed and the simulation must be in a loop. This decides the strong halting set H β , hence
The above procedure could be called the outlasting algorithm, as it works by employing the machine's uncountable tape as a sort of clock to outlast the possible halt time of T ω -computations by the Settling Theorem, analogous to the way that T ω decides the classical halting problem by outlasting possible halt times of Turing computations. In a certain way, one could accomplish the same thing with a device that is just an ITTM but affixed with a sort of 'oracle clock', an alarm that reads 0 until precisely θ number of steps have passed for some (otherwise unclockable) ordinal θ, then reads 1.
A perfectly natural question that now arises is: is ω 1 the smallest ordinal α such that T α T ω ? In other words, are all countable devices equally strong? In general, if |α| = |β|, must T α ∼ = T β ? We provide a negative answer. There is a countable device of strictly greater computational strength than T ω -namely,
Proof. The outlasting algorithm above decides the weak halting set h ω on T γ . 2
We show in Corollary 2.7 that T γ is the smallest device such that T γ T ω . We also show that T γ(γ) is the smallest device stronger than that, and so on (within the constraints of Section 2.4).
Writability
The literature on transfinite computation makes frequent use of the property of writability in the context of various computational models. Applied in the context of T α -machines, it has direct consequences on comparisons of devices' strengths. 
First, print a code for β on a scratch tape. Then, run a routine on scratch tape that is just like p except that each 'move right/left' instruction is replaced by 'move one cell higher/lower in accordance with the -ordering (and to C 0 if undefined)'. When the routine halts, unscramble the output string so that the output is f (x) by writing on the output tape the cell contents of the first α cells under . 2
Since there are countably many programs, there are countably many T α -writable ordinals. The ordinal λ(ω) in particular (denoted λ in [2, 13] , and elsewhere) is a large countable ordinal well studied in the literature. It is far larger than the Church-Kleene ordinal ω 1 ck . Indeed, it is shown in [2] that it is an admissible limit of admissible ordinals and is indescribable by Π 1 1 properties. It is shown that if β is T ω -writable, then so is any β < β, so the T ω -writable ordinals have no gaps and λ(ω) = {δ | δ is T ω -writable}. By contrast, the T ω -clockable ordinals do have gaps. If α is countable, the arguments from [2] in support of these observations can be straightforwardly applied to T α -writable and T α -clockable ordinals in general. Moreover, it is shown in [2] that λ ≤ γ, because any writable ordinal λ , once written on the tape, can be "counted through" in a halting procedure lasting at least λ steps. This result also straightforwardly generalizes to
In [13] , it is proven that λ ≥ γ, hence γ = λ (indeed, [13] shows γ A = λ A , where A is any oracle).
As a corollary, every T ω -clockable ordinal is T ω -writable. In light of Lemma 2.6 and the remarks above, this establishes the earlier claim that T γ (which is identical to T λ ) is the smallest device strictly stronger than T ω :
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 2.6 together with the fact that γ = λ = {δ | δ is T ω -writable}. 2
Remark 2.1. Some readers might find it a surprise that the smallest tape length to confer an increase of strength above T ω is γ, as opposed to either ω 1 , being the smallest higher cardinal, or ω ck 1 , the smallest non-recursive ordinal. In [5] and [4] , however, it is shown that γ behaves in certain ways as the analogue of ω Corollary 2.7 can be broadened to say that if λ(α) = γ(α) holds for some countable α, then for any T α -clockable ordinal β we have T α ∼ = T β . Does the equivalence λ(α) = γ(α) hold for all countable α? It will be seen that it holds for α = γ(ω) and for much larger choices of α, making good on the claim following Theorem 2.5 that T γ(γ) is the smallest device such that T γ(γ) T γ etc. For that matter, since the writable ordinals are gapless and T α can always clock α with a LoopAround, in view of Lemma 2.6 one can see that a countable T α for which the λ(α) = γ(α) condition is true is equivalent to a corresponding oracle ITTM device (that is, a T ω A for which A contains a code for α). Such devices are already relatively well understood (see [2] ), so the set of these T α can be equally well understood. Since these T α can write a code for α, we can think of a so-called "γ jump" operation for them that corresponds precisely with the transfinite Turing jump operator
However, it turns out that the equivalence γ(α) = λ(α) does not hold in general for all countable T α . We show below that the parallel between T α machines and oracle ITTMs breaks down at some stage.
Incommensurability
Once it is seen that devices can increase in strength as their tapes become longer, it is normal to expect that a longer tape in general results in a device that is always at least as strong as the smaller device, and sometimes stronger. That is, given a hardware device, one would naturally expect that adding cells onto the tape would make it no worse off. So if α < β and you can compute some function with T α , then you can also compute that function with T β . As hinted earlier in the paper, however, this is not so. We do not have that T α T β either; we are able to show that two devices can have mutually incomparable strength. At the same time, there is a slice of H μ undecidable by T μ but decidable by T ω 1 , namely the set {p | μ p (a) ↓}, where a is a μ-length string of 1s. It is T μ -undecidable for the usual (classical diagonal) reasons, and T ω 1 -decidable by the outlasting algorithm from Theorem 2.4 (after using the string a as a reference to reach and then emulate T μ ). 2
The above shows the counterintuitive fact that it is possible for a smaller device to have some capability not possessed by a larger device. Indeed, the proof given above applies equally well to any countable μ ≥ μ, so one can say that of the devices shorter than T ω 1 , it is not just some but "almost all" of them that are not commensurable with T ω 1 . All this said, the reader may find the machine's ability to print a μ-length string of 1s to be a relatively unimpressive feat for T μ to hold over T ω 1 . Of what utility is a μ-length tape filled with 1s? It would be more remarkable if a small device could instead be shown, e.g., to write a real x not writable by a larger device. Later we show such an example.
Having seen that T ω 1 is not at least as strong as all smaller devices-indeed, as most of them-one is naturally drawn to ask whether this phenomenon is possible strictly between two countable devices. That is, if α and β are both countable, is it possible for T α and T β to be incommensurable? Or are all countable devices commensurable, forming a monotonically increasing hierarchy of strength as tape length increases? We have the following answer: Proposition 2.9. There are countable α and β such that neither T α T β nor T α T β .
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Proof. We argue that there is a countable elementary substructure V of the universe V in which there exist two incommensurable devices (just as in V ), and then show by absoluteness that in V , these devices, which we know are countable, must be incommensurable still.
Let α p (x) ↓ θ [H = ξ] denote that if T α is running program p on input x then it will halt in θ many steps and with head position ξ. We begin by observing that V |= φ(μ, ω 1 , ω 2 ), where φ(ξ, α, β) stands for the below Δ 0 formula for the statement, "ξ < α < β and C ξ is not reachable on T α ." The formula actually states that for some limit ordinal θ 1 , cell ξ is not reachable on T α before step θ 1 and T α must halt before this step or else enter a loop (in the sense of footnote 10), which implies that C ξ is unreachable: ξ < α < β ∧ ∃θ 1 
All of the notions abbreviated in the above by shorthand are defined by recursion from Δ 0 notions, and are therefore absolute for transitive models of ZF -P (cf. [10, Ch. IV Thm. 5.6] φ(ν, α, β) . By construction, the formula φ(ν, α, β) guarantees that there exist countable limit ordinals θ 1 < θ 2 < β such that T α cannot reach cell ν before step θ 1 and will enter a loop in any computation performed on input 0 still running at θ 1 . Since T α is in a loop, it will never escape and halt on C ν . 2
Since even countable devices can be incommensurable, the hierarchical "jumping" structure described at the end of the previous section continues through the countable ordinals up to a certain point, after which the trend must stop. At what ordinal does this happen? That is, how large is the smallest device T δ that cannot reach all its cells, i.e., cannot emulate all devices beneath it? This is currently an open question, though it seems as though it should not be difficult. In Proposition 2.10, it is established that at the very least this ordinal is larger than ζ (defined in [2] and below). Definition 2.4. If a T α -computation α p (x) is in a loop while its tape content y is unchanging, we write α p (x) ↑ y. If there exists a program p such that α p (0) ↑ y, then we say that y is eventually T α -writable. An ordinal is eventually T α -writable if it is coded by an eventually α-writable real. Denote the supremum of eventually α-writable ordinals ζ(α). 16 Let ζ = ζ(ω).
Remark 2.2. Like the writable ordinals, the eventually writable ordinals have no gaps. It is clear from the definition that we have λ ≤ ζ, and in [2] it is shown that λ < ζ. We can assert the generalization λ(α) < ζ(α) by much the same argument. It is known that just as λ is very large and possesses a significant number of strong closure properties, the same is all the more true for ζ.
Proposition 2.10. Let δ be as above. Then δ is larger than ζ.
Proof. By the previous remark, it suffices to show that T ζ can write a real coding ζ, since this implies that T ζ can write codes for all smaller ordinals and thus reach all its cells by Propositions 2.1 and 2.6. We code ζ by first simulating the universal T ω machine described in [13] . Its behavior is to run a nonhalting computation that prints increasingly large ordinals (until inevitably it enters into an endless loop). After ζ steps, the tape content has a code for ζ. While this T ω universal machine simulation is running, the device T ζ can simultaneously run a ζ-clock with LoopAround, and halt the simulation as soon as the clock halts. 2
We conclude with the promised demonstration that there is a real unwritable by a (countable) device that is writable by a smaller device. Proposition 2.11. There exist countable α < α such that there is a real x that is T α -writable but not T α -writable.
Proof. We know that there exists a countable device that is unable to write a code for its own tape length (for the ability to do so implies the ability to write codes for all smaller ordinals, hence to emulate the computations of all smaller devices by Lemma 2.6). Let T δ be the smallest such device. Note that for any device, an ordinal θ that is both clockable and eventually writable must be writable: simply run an algorithm that eventually writes θ while constantly checking the output tape to see whether its content can be "counted down" for a number of counts equal to the duration of a simulated θ-clock. Thus λ(δ) < δ, because λ(δ) is not writable but is eventually writable (cf. [2, Thm. 3.8] ). By construction, T λ(δ) can write a code for λ(δ) but T δ can't. 2
